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Major Field: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
 
Abstract: This research study investigates the impact of top management team 
diversity (TMT) on the quality of acquisition decisions as reflected in announcement 
returns to acquirer shareholders. Firms pursue acquisitions with the strategic rationale of 
increasing shareholder value, improving market share, and achieving economies of scale. 
Despite these compelling motivations, acquisitions have not always yielded the desired 
results in terms of increasing shareholder value.  This is generally attributed to poor 
decision making on the part of the TMT. Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMT 
decision quality is enhanced when team members come from diverse backgrounds as they 
bring diversity of opinions and resource knowledge which allow for a more robust sharing 
of ideas and viable alternatives. Therefore, this study focuses on TMT diversity traits the 
dimensions of gender diversity, age diversity, job diversity, cultural diversity, tenure 
diversity, and political affiliation diversity and how these diversity traits impact the 
decision making process as reflected in the announcement returns of acquirer. I use 
announcement period returns to acquirer shareholders as my measure of acquisition 
decision quality due to its extensive use in the finance literature to assess the efficacy 
corporate policies including investment decisions (Guiso et al., 2008; Bottazzi et al., 2010), 
cash holdings (Chen et al., 2015) and cost of capital (Gray et al., 2013).  
I find that age diversity, political diversity, current tenure diversity, and cultural 
diversity have significant effect on acquisition quality. This means that the shareholders of 
acquiring firms overall can expect to earn higher abnormal returns when these 
aforementioned diversity characteristics are present at the TMT level of the firm. 
Additionally, I find that the impact of these diversity characteristics on acquirer returns are 
more profound when the deal value of the acquisition is at least 20% of the acquiring firm’s 
size. Furthermore, I also find that TMT diversity characteristics such as gender diversity 
and total tenure diversity do not have significant effect on acquisition quality as reflected 
in the announcement returns of the acquirer. Thus, not all diversity characteristics appear 
to enhance acquisition decision quality. In conclusion, TMT diversity overall promotes 
better decision making. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I examine the role of top management team (TMT) diversity on the 
quality of acquisition decisions as reflected in announcement returns to acquirer 
shareholders. Acquisitions are significant investments and are noticeable types of 
transactions and are deemed long term (Marks and Mirvis 2001). Existing literatures 
support the premise that firms pursue and undertake acquisitions with the strategic rationale 
of increasing shareholder value, improving market share, gaining competitive advantage, 
achieving economies of scale, and acquiring additional resources and capabilities that the 
acquiror lacks.  Despite these strong and compelling motivations for a firm to pursue and 
invest in acquisitions, these acquisitions have not always yielded the desired results from 
the standpoint of increasing shareholder value (Moeller, Schlingemann et al., 2005; Jensen, 
1986).
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Mergers and acquisition (M&A) activity constitutes a significant portion of corporate 
investment initiatives and endeavors. In 2017, the aggregate deal value in the U.S. totaled 1.5 
trillion and the first half of 2018 has totaled in excess of 900 billion in transactional value (Erel, 
I, 2018). The most striking observation in looking at the data is that, not all the acquisition 
deals resulted in value creation for the shareholder. This observation is supported by existing 
studies which posit that over 50 percent of acquisition deals end up performing below 
expectations (Koi-Akrofi 2016) and consequently, reducing shareholder value in the process. 
A case in point is the Hewlett-Packard acquisition of the U.K. based enterprise company 
Autonomy (Stanwick and Stanwick 2014). Hewlett-Packard paid over $10 billion dollars for 
the acquisition and ended up taking $9 billion write-off or impairment of the acquired assets 
resulting in a huge loss to the shareholders. Another example of a well-intended acquisition 
that ended up decreasing shareholder value was the case of Daimler-Chrysler. Prior to Chrysler 
becoming a private company, it was on the list of S&P’s 500. In 1998, it was acquired by 
German automaker Daimler in a $39 billion equity swap (Badrtalei and Bates 2007). This 
acquisition failed to yield the expected value creation in terms of competitive advantage, and 
increased cash flows. Instead, it resulted a class-action law suit that forced the eventual sale of 
Chrysler to a private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management in 2007 resulting in $7 billion 
loss to the shareholders.   
Also making the list is the gargantuan American Online (AOL) and Time Warner 
merger and acquisition. For this transaction, AOL acquired Timer Warner in a $164 billion 
deal that closed in 2000. The immediate 18 months following the acquisition was the most 
turbulent for AOL mainly due to the infamous $99 billion reported loss and the attempt to 
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reconstitute the merged company back into its original components thereby resulting in a huge 
decrease of shareholder value (Bodie 2005).  
Consistent with the anecdotal evidence above, academic research studies have 
confirmed the failure rates associated with acquisitions (Haleblian, et al., 2009; KPMG, 1999, 
2014; Rottig et al., 2013). The literature on acquisitions is replete with research studies that 
have evaluated the impact of acquisitions on the participating companies (Caiazza and Volpe 
2015). These existing studies have focused on how acquisitions impact solvency from the 
standpoint of the acquiring firm, as well as how it impacts the risk profile and shareholder 
value. Moeller, Schlingemann et al., (2005), and Hayward and Hambrick (1997) conclude that 
the lackluster performance of many acquisitions are driven by poor acquisition strategies, poor 
decision making, and executive hubris. The agency-theoretical explanations supporting why 
acquisitions do not necessary lead to shareholder value creation is the hubris and agency 
hypothesis which posits that TMT executives have the tendency to overestimate their 
capabilities in terms of identifying, negotiating and executing successful acquisitions 
(Hayward and Hambrick 1997) deals that are in the interest of shareholders. Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) in their study which focused on the conditions in the acquiring firm argued 
that the abysmal performance of acquisitions can be attributable to unrealistic expectations of 
TMT rooted in the TMT’s power and penchant for aggrandizement.   
The anecdotal evidence and the empirical literature suggest that an effectively 
constituted TMT should yield better acquisition decisions.  This is especially so because of the 
strategic nature and the critical role that TMT members play in driving the overall strategy and 
direction (Dezsö and Ross 2012; Wang, Sui et al. 2014) of the firm. In this thesis, I examine 
whether the diversity of TMT has an impact on the quality of acquisition decision.  According 
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to Hambrick, Cho et al. (1996), firms with diverse TMT in terms of functional backgrounds, 
education, and tenure demonstrate high tendency for action and these actions are usually very 
impactful in both magnitude and substance. The relevant argument in support of this position 
is that, TMT diversity at the firm level presents a better strategic decision making process due 
to readily available cognitive and knowledge-based resources among TMT members which are 
essential skills required for solving complicated problems (Hambrick, Cho et al. 1996).  
The other argument of significant importance is that according to the Upper Echelons 
Theory in terms of making decisions (Hambrick and Mason 1984), heterogeneous teams are 
better at processing complex information in comparison to homogeneous teams thereby, 
creating a sort of think-tank scenario at the TMT level of the firm resulting in a significantly 
improved quality of decision. Given that the decision making process and capabilities of the 
TMT members are critical to the success and smooth execution of an acquisition deal that 
creates value (Saxton and Dollinger 2004), this research study seeks to investigate and evaluate 
the impact of TMT diversity on acquisition decision quality as reflected in the announcement 
returns of the acquiring firm. Specifically, I address the following research questions: 
1. Does TMT diversity affect the quality of acquisition decision as reflected in the 
announcement return? 
2. Are all diversity characteristics important or only some of them, if so, which ones? 
 The study focuses on TMT diversity traits along several dimensions including: gender, age, 
job diversity, cultural diversity, education, tenure, and political affiliation. I use announcement 
period returns to acquirer shareholders as my measure of acquisition decision quality.  
Announcement period returns are extensively used in the finance literature to assess the 
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efficacy corporate policies including investment decisions (Guiso et al., 2008; Bottazzi et al., 
2010), cash holdings (Chen et al., 2015, capital structure (Chui et al., 2002), and cost of capital 
(Gray et al., 2013).
6 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, I cover some of the background literature relevant to my study. 
Specifically, I cover the following streams of literature: (1) announcement effects of 
mergers and acquisitions (2) effect of TMT diversity on effective decision making, and (3) 
effect of TMT diversity on firm performance.  
2.1. Announcement Period and Acquirer Returns 
Announcement returns have been used extensively in financial research to assess, 
among other things, the efficacy of various corporate policies/decisions.  For example, 
announcement returns have been used to study the effects of dividends, repurchases, debt 
and equity issuances, board changes, and merger and acquisitions. In this section, I 
present an overview of the literature on announcement effects of mergers and 
acquisitions. This literature is important because I am assessing acquisition quality using 
announcement shareholder returns.  This measure most directly captures shareholders’ 
assessment of management’s acquisition decision contemporaneously with when the 
decision is made public.    
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Table 1 and Table 2 below highlight and summarize these earlier research studies 
conducted over the past two decades on acquirer performance around the announcement 
period utilizing event (i.e. even window) study methodology and the authors provide 
evidence pointing to some acquirers showing positive returns whiles others show negative 
returns around announcement period. However, the studies are remarkable in that, 
regardless of whether the announcement period returns are positive or negative, they 
closely cluster around zero.  Across all the studies in the two tables, the median 
announcement period return is only 1.45 percent (not adjusting for differences in the 
announcement windows examined).  This contrasts with the sizeable returns experienced 
by target firms which average around 25.22 percent (Schwert, 2000; Kaplan and Weisbach, 
1992; Servaes, 1991; Bradley et al., 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989).      
The underwhelming acquirer announcement returns are often used to support the 
argument that acquisition decisions are on average ineffective. Despite the low absolute 
announcement returns to acquirer shareholders, many of these studies also find that cross-
sectional variations in the returns are systematically related to number of firms, deal, and 
management related variables.  This implies that shareholders are able to discriminate 
between what are perceived to be good and bad deals. 
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Firm and deal characteristics associated with significant acquirer returns include 
acquirer efficiencies (i.e. the acquirer’s ability to plan their resource allocations to align 
with corporate strategy), relative size of the deal, cash vs. stock offers, Tobin’s Q of 
acquirer, monopoly power or the redistributions from other stakeholders1.
                                                          
1 Golubov et. al. (2015) took these earlier explanations in terms of the drivers behind acquirer returns 
around announcement day even further by positing that acquirer returns could be attributed to acquirer 
firm fixed effects. They suggest that firm fixed effects form a significant part (i.e. depending on size) of the 
variations in acquirer returns in contrast to the variables identified by the earlier studies. Thus, Golubov et. 
al (2015) asserted that firms have attributes that allow them to either specifically benefit from synergies 
with their acquisitions or, have extraordinary capabilities and abilities at valuing good and prospective 
targets. 
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Table 1 
Acquirer Returns: Evidence from Event Studies 
Panel A: Studies Reporting Positive Returns to Acquirer 
Author(s) Study Period Sample size Country Event Window Main findings 
Song and Walking 
(2004) 
1985-2001 5726 mergers and acquisitions US -1 to 0 days Acquirer earned 1% positive abnormal returns 
(i.e. acquirer bid activity dormant for more than a 
year), and insignificant return if acquirer bid 
activity is dormant for less than a year. 
Walker (2000) 1980-1996 278 acquisitions, 230 mergers 
and 48 tender offers 
US -2 to +2 days Significant negative abnormal returns of -0.84% 
(t=-1.91 which is significant at the 0.10 level) 
Kohers and Kohers 
(2000) 
1987-1996 961 cash deals 
673 stock deals 
1634 whole sample 
US 0 and +1 days positive cumulative abnormal returns: 
+1.37% cash deals 
+1.09% stock 
+1.26% whole sample 
Jarrell, Poulsen 
(1989) 
1963-1986 461 acquisitions US -5 to +5 days +0.92% positive cumulative abnormal returns  
(t=2.36 which is significant at the 0.10 level) 
Bradley, Desai, Kim 
(1988) 
1963-1984 236 acquisitions US -5 to +5 days +0.97% positive cumulative abnormal returns with 
a t-statistic of 1.69. This is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. 
Mulherin (2000) 1962-1997 161 acquisitions US -1 to 0 days +0.85% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Leeth, Borg (2000) 1919-1930 466 acquisitions US -40 to 0 days +3.12% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Bradley et al. (1983) 1962–1980 241 successful and 
94 unsuccessful bidders 
US -20 tyo +20 days -Unsuccessful bidders gain, on average, 2.32% 
over −20 to +1 day, but lose −2.96% as soon as the 
bid failure is revealed (+2 to +20 days). Both 
statistically significant. 
-Unsuccessful bidders exhibit insignificant gains of 
−0.64% over −20 to +20 day period. 
Jarrell, Brickley, 
Netter (1988) 
1962-1985 440 acquisitions US -10 to +5 days +1.14% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Schwert (1996) 1975-1991 666 acquisitions US -42 to +126 days +1.4% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Maquieira et al 
(1998) 
1963-1996 55 non-conglomerate deals 
47 conglomerate deals 
US -60 to +60 +6.14%** non-conglomerate 
-4.79% conglomerate deals 
Smith, Kim (1994) 1980-1986 177acquisitions US -5 to +5 days 
-1 to 0 days 
+0.50% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
+0.23% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins (1983) 
1963-1979 170 acquisitions US -20 to +1 days +3.48% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
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Table 2 
Acquirer Returns: Evidence from Event Studies 
Panel B: Studies Reporting Negative Returns to Acquirer 
Author(s) Study Period Sample size Country Event Window Main findings 
Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003) 
1983-1995 519 acquisitions US -1 to +1 acquirers earn abnormal returns of between −1.39% 
and −1.47% (significant) using variety of benchmarks. 
Gupta and Misra (2004) 1980-1998 285 mergers and 
acquisitions 
US -10 to +10 
days 
Acquirer lose significant 1.57% over the -1 to 0 event 
window. The returns over -10 to -2 and +1 to +10 
were insignificant. 
DeLong (2001) 1988-1995 280 acquisitions US -10 to +1 days -1.68% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Mulherin and Boone 
(2000) 
1990-1999 281 acquisitions US -1 to +1 days -0.37% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Sirrower (1994) 1979-1990 168 acquisitions US -1 to +1 days -2.3% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Healy, Palepu, Ruback 
(1992) 
1979-1984 50 acquisitions US -5 to +5 days -2.2% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Lang et al. (1991) 1968–1986 87 targets and bidders 
from successful tender 
offers 
US -5 to +5 Negative abnormal returns ranging from −6% to −7% 
from single, opposed bids (significant). Insignificant 
abnormal returns to multiple, opposed bids. 
Jennings, Mazzeo (1991) 1979-1985 352 acquisitions US -1 to 0 days -0.8% positive cumulative abnormal returns 
Franks, Harris, Titman 
(1991) 
1975-1984 399 acquisitions US -5 to +5 days -1.45% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Kaplan, Weisbach (1992) 1971-1982 271 acquisitions US -5 to +5 days -1.49% negative cumulative abnormal returns 
Mitchell and Lehn (1990) 1980–1988 228 hostile targets, 240 
friendly targets, 232 
bidders  
US -1 to +1 days Abnormal returns of −1.66% to acquiring firms 
restructured following bid. 0.70% to acquiring firms 
that are not restructured post-bid period (significant). 
Malatesta (1983) 1969–1974 256 acquiring firms US −60 to +12 
months 
0.043% average abnormal return from −60 months 
(significant). −0.054% average abnormal return 
(significant) from month 1 after the bid until 6. 
Lang et al. (1989) 1968–1986 87 targets and bidders 
from successful tender 
offers 
US -5 to +5 days Negative impact on bidder returns when the bid is 
made by a low Tobin’s q firm. Acquirers earn 0.8% 
from unopposed bids and −0.14% from opposed bids 
(neither is significant). 
Asquith (1983) 1962–1976 285 acquisitions US +1 to +240 
days 
Losses of −7.2% to successful bidders and −9.6% to 
unsuccessful bidders in the post-outcome period 
(both significant). 
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Of special interest to my study is the effect of management and board attributes on 
acquirer announcement returns. Jaffe et al. (2013) find that CEO identity plays a significant 
role in explaining and determining the underlying consistency in acquirer performance. 
That is, their study brought to light the fact that if an acquirer is successful in an acquisition 
and retains the same CEO for its next acquisition deal, the odds are that the average return 
to the acquirer is significantly greater than the return for a firm that had a bad acquisition 
and retained associated CEO. Thus, they did not find consistency in the announcement 
returns when the firm changes CEO. Based on this finding, they drew the conclusion that 
announcement returns of the acquirer are significantly more related to the CEO specific 
characteristics rather than firm specific characteristics.    
Harford et al. (2012) looked into acquirer returns with the objective of explaining 
why entrenched managers enter into acquisition deals that destroy shareholder value. Thus, 
instead of looking into firms that have the special capabilities of identifying good 
acquisition targets, they are more interested in understanding managers who have the 
penchant for continuously making bad acquisition decisions. Their research suggests that 
shareholder value destroying acquisitions, as evident in lower than expected acquirer 
returns, is attributed to the attempt by managers’ quest to maintain entrenched positions in 
their decision making process. They defined “entrenched” position as having 10 or more 
of the anti-takeover provisions in the GIM index (Gompers et al., 2003). 
Other recent papers also researched the specifics of director characteristics and how 
these characteristics affect acquisition activity and its outcomes. For example, Levi et al. 
(2014) researched the effect that a director’s gender could potentially have on acquisition 
returns. Their results posit that female directors are less inclined to overstate merger and 
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acquisition gains therefore, are predisposed to make comparatively fewer acquisitions and 
pay marginal and lower premiums for acquisition deals. Based on these findings, they 
presented the argument that suggests that board diversity impact acquisition decisions and 
corporate policies. In a similar study, Miletkov et al. (2017) looked at the impact to 
acquisition returns when firms add a foreign director to their board. The findings of their 
research suggest that firms do in fact benefit if the director hails from a country noted for 
higher governance structure thus, the acquirer realizes positive returns during acquisition 
announcement period.     
Elnahas and Kim (2017) studied political contributions by establishing the political 
affiliations of CEOs of firms to see if such political affiliations have any impact on the 
outcome of acquisition decisions in terms of acquirer returns. Their research findings 
support the argument that CEOs that contribute to the Republican party are less likely to 
engage in mergers and acquisitions decisions. On the other hand, if they pursue an 
acquisition, the deal is usually consummated by the use cash payment. Thus, Republican 
CEOs seem to prefer acquisitions deals with less information asymmetry.  
In summary, the announcement studies reveal that while acquisition decisions do 
not appear to gain overwhelming endorsement from their shareholders, the perception of 
acquisitions is significantly related to certain firm, deal, and management characteristics.  
One management characteristic that has not been examined is the quality of the top 
management team as revealed by the diversity of the executive team.   Thus, my research 
contributes to the M&A literature and provides a new perspective on the important 
relationship between TMT diversity and acquirer announcement returns.  
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In the next sections I discuss some of the background literature on TMT diversity 
and its importance for firm performance and acquisition quality decision. 
2.2. Upper Echelon Theory, TMT Diversity and (Effective) Decision Making 
In this section I discuss the Upper Echelon Theory as a basis for understanding the 
effect of TMT diversity on effective decision making. Strategic decisions by TMT ranks 
as one of the dominant and significant roles and responsibility of management and as 
posited by Carpenter et al. (2004), upper echelon theory focuses on TMT background as 
the primary indicator of TMT mindset, behavior and orientations such as corporate 
decisions and governance. Upper echelon theory lays the foundation for understanding the 
impact of TMT diversity on the overall decision-making process of the firm which in 
essence, translates into how the firm operates, competes and perform in the marketplace. 
The dominant coalition (Cyert and March, 1963) in a firm is its top managers and the 
effectiveness, strategies and the overall direction of the firm are viewed as a direct 
consequence of the values and cognitive bases of the dominant coalition – that is its top 
managers (Hambrick, 1984).  
Building upon these assertions, Ferrier (2001) investigated the dynamics of TMT 
impact on firm competitive undertakings. Leveraging a composite measure of TMT 
heterogeneity, Ferrier (2001) find that TMT heterogeneity was positively correlated with 
firm competitive pursuits. In essence, Ferrier’s study supports the position that 
heterogeneous TMTs are more inclined to pursue and initiate competitive actions that result 
in subsequent gains and value creation for shareholders. Additionally, his findings buttress 
the extensive literature on the benefits and of heterogeneity (Carpenter, 2002; Williams 
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and O’Reilly, 1998) – most importantly, the instances where the socio-cognitive benefits 
of TMT heterogeneity permit TMTs to better handle tasks of higher complexity whereas 
the socio-cognitive conflict also invariably undermines and slows down critical 
cooperative efforts required for effective strategy execution. Other scholars studied the 
linkage between TMT background and the implications on firm performance and find that 
tenure diversity affects and leads to the likelihood of a successful acquisition (Bergh, 2001; 
Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Specifically, attracting and retaining long tenured TMT 
level members is positively correlated with firm performance due to the fact that long 
tenured TMT executives possess knowledge of the internal workings and the relationships 
required to ensure firm performance and success.  
As the quest by scholars to link TMT and decision making grows, so does the 
curiosity surrounding what is inside the “black box” of the upper echelons. It is in this 
regard that studies such as the ones conducted by Denis, Lamothe, and Langley (2001) and 
Smith et al. (1994) drew considerable attention to the urgent need to refine our 
understanding around the processes and framework by which TMT member level 
characteristics impact firm performance in terms of decision processes. Papadakis and 
Barwise (2002) research the circumstances under which TMT characteristics impact 
strategic decision making process. Their study find that the CEOs and other key members 
of the TMT impact the strategic decision making process but with varying impacts. For 
example, they find that CEO tenure was correlated with a more decentralized decision 
making approach whereas TMT education diversity impacted the overall decision making 
process. 
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One of the comprehensive studies conducted using the upper echelon theory was 
by Peterson et al. (2003). Their study find that CEO characteristics and personality traits 
can impact the dynamics of the top management team thereby affecting the overall strategic 
decision making process and in turn, reflects in performance differences among firms. 
Their overarching basis as grounded in the upper echelon theory is that CEO individual 
differences such as agreeableness, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness and 
emotional stability have a significant impact on strategic decisions and TMT group 
processes and that these dynamics would invariably reflect in firm performance. In 
affirmation of this theory, they find positive impact on sales growth and return on assets 
mediated by TMT level dynamics.  
Other existing body of literature reveal that diversity at the TMT level can be 
harnessed to align managerial objectives with those of shareholders (Hambrick and et al., 
2005; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick and Cannella, 2004) and again, this 
position is derived from the work of Hambrick and Mason (1984) which posits that 
diversity among TMT members as reflected in their varying characteristics is expected to 
increase decision quality. This position is grounded in their conclusion to the effect that 
routine problem solving in most cases can be addressed by homogenous groups whereas, 
ill-defined, complex and novel problems are best addressed and resolved by a 
heterogeneous group where diversity of opinions, resource knowledge, experience and 
background allow for a more robust sharing of ideas and viable alternatives.  
Within the framework of the upper echelon theoretical explanation, Watson, 
Kumar, and Michaelson (1993) posits that heterogeneous groups outperform homogeneous 
groups. They base their argument on the premise that strategic decision making is a process 
16 
 
that is characterized by significant complexity, uncertainty and non-routine tasks therefore, 
heterogeneous groups thus tend to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the 
decision making process which then leads to improved firm performance. Finally, it is 
worth noting and affirming that within the perspective of the upper echelon theory, TMT 
diversity influence firm level decisions such as strategic direction (Yang and Wang, 2014), 
speed of strategic responses (Hambrick et al., 1996), acquisition success (Nadolska and 
Barkema, 2014) and these are based on the premise that TMT heterogeneity result in better 
overall strategic decisions and improved firm performance.    
2.3. TMT Diversity and Firm Performance 
In this section, I present an overview of the empirical evidence on the effect of 
diversity on decision making and firm performance.2  In the finance and management 
literature, there is extensive coverage on the topic of TMT diversity and these studies 
underscore the fact that diversity at the executive level of the firm and its impact on firm 
performance cannot be ignored in terms of decision making, communicative skills, risk 
aversions, and conservatism (Ittonen, Miettinen et al. 2010); Balakrishnan, Watts et al. 
2016; Williamson 1988; Velte, 2017). Some earlier studies suggest that TMT diversity 
influences values, perceptions, cognition and decision processes at the firm level (Yang 
and Wang, 2014; Dezso and Ross, 2012; Dixon-Fowler et al., 2013). As a result of these 
findings, it has been established that diversity at the TMT level can have both positive and 
negative effects on the decision quality of the firm which invariably impact firm 
                                                          
2 I present more in depth coverage of the relevant literature on diversity when discussing my specific 
hypotheses on the effect on various diversity attributes on acquisition quality. 
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performance (Parola, Ellis et al., 2015; Kauer, Prinzessin zu Wal deck et al., 2007; Triana, 
Miller et al., 2013).  
Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Frijns, Dodd et al. (2016) examined the impact of 
diversity in terms of gender, age, and experience on firm performance. The outcome of 
their research suggest that gender and cultural diversity are both positively correlated with 
firm performance and contributes positively to the increase of shareholder value through 
the consolidation of diversely rich viewpoints. The benefits of diversity is derived from the 
vital contributable information resources  (Kauer, Prinzessin zu Waldeck et al. 2007), 
improved ability to assess strategic decisions (Hambrick and Mason 1984), and the benefit 
of being able to scan for vital information (Keck 1997). These benefits have the potential 
to significantly improve the quality of the decision making process during an acquisition 
endeavor.  
In contrast, other earlier studies found negative impact of TMT diversity on the 
decision making process thereby underscoring the significant decline in effective 
communication among TMT members (Ring and Van de Ven 1994), rise in within conflicts 
due to differences in perspectives (Simons, Pelled et al. 1999) and the lack of consensus 
building (Knight, Pearce et al. 1999) due to varying positions on subjects of strategic 
importance as the main causes of the negative effect on firm performance. Undoubtedly, 
these conflicting findings, thus – the positive and negative effects of TMT diversity on firm 
performance would invariably impact acquisition quality. 
The foregoing literature review identifies two research gaps that this study hopes 
to fill.  First, the literature on acquisitions reveals that despite the potentially transformative 
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nature of such events, on average acquisitions are associated with announcement returns 
that are close to zero suggesting that investors do not ascribe significant wealth effects to 
such decisions.  Given the human and financial resources that are expended on acquisitions, 
it is important to look at all the contributing factors that could potentially impact and 
influence acquirer performance. Surprisingly, the earlier studies that examined acquirer 
returns did not give any considerations to TMT diversity which I consider to be a key factor 
that cannot be ignored considering all the strategic decisions that precede any acquisition 
endeavor. Considering that specialized skills set are required during the decision-making 
process does not only call for, but also lends credence to the fact that a diverse background 
is required to ensure a value creating acquisition transaction.  Second, the literature on 
TMT diversity and firm performance is mixed.  In part this may be because according to 
UET, the value of diversity is greatest when confronting complex problems.  Acquisitions 
fall into this class and are ideally suited to test the hypothesis that diversity is especially 
beneficial in a complex decision setting consistent with the UET.  Thus, this study hopes 
to contribute to both the acquisitions and the diversity literatures by connecting the 
diversity literature and M&A literature to bring out the important relationship between 
TMT diversity and its effect on acquisition quality by empirically looking into how human-
related characteristics (i.e. TMT diversity) potentially affect acquisition quality as reflected 
in the announcement returns.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
 
3.1. TMT and Acquisition Quality 
The level of uncertainty surrounding acquisitions and the complex nature of the 
process underscores the relevance of the role of TMT members (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Buono and Bowditch, 2003; Pablo, Sitkin et al., 1996; Gomes, Angwin et al., 2013; 
Nadolska and Barkema, 2014). The acquisition process revolves around a myriad of key 
decision milestones that must be achieved and executed right from the beginning of the 
acquisition process to the end (Gomes, Angwin et al. 2013). These decision milestones 
include the identification of the target, the negotiation and ironing out of deal terms, and 
the timing of executing the deal. These decisions require knowledge resources, cognition, 
experience and capabilities lumped into one functioning unit.  
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Mirc (2014) in his study on the human impact on acquisition performance alluded to the 
fact that the initial phase in an impending acquisition deal revolves around addressing 
several key strategic questions by the management team. His study deliberated on a few 
of these key decision questions including the decision of whether to acquire or not 
acquire, what price to pay for the transaction, what mode of payment is preferred, what 
time frame is desired, et cetera. The approach to these essential questions and mechanism 
by which they are addressed could directly and indirectly impact the outcome and quality 
of the acquisition.  
Pablo, Sitkin et al. (1996) studied acquisition decision-making processes and their 
findings underscore management’s risk propensities and risk perceptions as forming the 
foundation of whether to or not to acquire, as well as the selection and evaluation of the 
prospective acquisition candidates. They define risk propensity as the general inclination 
of an individual TMT to either avoid or take risk and the mechanism by which the team 
member evaluates and decides which level of risk is tolerable. They also defined risk 
perception as the individual team member’s understanding and assessment of the inherent 
risk surrounding a given scenario and how they can control for the perceived risk. In their 
model, they concluded that the higher the decision maker’s risk propensity, the stronger 
the pursued strategy which results in the ultimate decision to acquire, and the opposite 
effect is true thereby leading to the abrogation of the acquisition deal if the risk propensity 
of the decision maker is low. 
Acquisitions are noticeable events and represent a significant growth strategy that 
requires several decision making processes and these decision making processes come with 
substantially measurable changes to the acquirer (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). One of 
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the most critical phases in the acquisition process is the phase where the firm makes a 
determination whether to go forward with the deal or to discontinue the process, and this 
critical decision takes place prior to the announcement of the deal (Buono and Bowditch 
2003). Undoubtedly, acquisition endeavors present huge challenges and are regarded as 
very complex and often times, uncertain strategic events (Zollo 2009) and by their nature, 
provide an excellent platform for researchers and practitioners alike to analyze the 
heterogeneity among TMT members and empirically determine the impact of these 
diversity characteristics on the quality of the acquisition as reflected in the announcement 
return. As detailed out, TMT diversity characteristics have been posited to have a myriad 
of effects, both positive and negative on firm performance. This argument can be extended 
to acquisition quality from the standpoint that, an any decision taken require varying 
leadership abilities, cognition, and experiences.  
Despite the extensive research studies on TMT diversity characteristics (Haleblian, 
Devers et al. 2009; Bergh 2001) and its impact on firm performance, there is no empirical 
study that I am aware of that looked into the critical issue of TMT diversity and its impact 
on acquisition decision quality as reflected in the announcement returns. While 
homogeneous top management teams are known for making expedited decisions, there are 
other prominent studies such as studies conducted by Ferrier (2001) and Nadolska & 
Barkema (2014) that suggest that heterogeneous TMTs are better at handling more 
complex problems. It is in line with this team heterogeneity effect that a sound 
understanding human’s diversity characteristics and how it affects acquisition quality is 
worth studying.  
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To test the effect of TMT diversity on acquisition quality, one has to first identify 
relevant diversity attributes.  Buyl, Boone et al. (2011), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
and Goll and Rasheed (2005) suggest that TMT members are made up of a unique group 
of individuals with diverse backgrounds and their diversities are grounded in different 
biases and prejudices and the behavior of these TMT members as individual contributors 
to the whole, are influenced by power affiliations and social constraints. In line with this 
view point, diversity when placed within the context of the organization can be defined to 
include the differences in race, gender, nationality, age, cultural background education and 
marital status resulting in potential behavioral differences among group members in 
relation to other groups (Acquavita, Pittman et al., 2009; Larkey, 1996).  For my study, I 
consider the following diversity attributes: culture, gender, education, age, tenure and 
political affiliation. In the next few subsections I present my arguments as to why I chose 
these attributes and the hypothesized effect on acquisition quality.   
3.2. Cultural Diversity and Acquisition Quality 
Culture is defined as the “collective programming of the mind that distinguishes 
members of a group or category from one another” (Hofstede 2001). It represents an 
implied framework compared to obvious institutions rules, regulations, or a political 
system. Ferreira (2010) defines cultural diversity as a group of diverse individuals who 
exhibit varying tendencies when it comes to prejudices and biases and whose behavior tend 
to be affected by social limitations.  Academic researchers have in recent years been 
drawing attention to the role that cultural diversity play in organizational settings 
(Ahammad and Glaister, 2011; Faulkner, Teerikangas et al., 2012). National origin of 
individuals serves as the basis of their culture and it reflects the institutional environment 
23 
 
that shaped their formative years (Hambrick et al., 1998) and to a greater extent, how they 
cope with uncertainty, and how they decipher and make important decisions (Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2007).  
Several studies find that culture affects corporate policies including investment 
decisions (Guiso et al., 2008; Bottazzi et al., 2010), cash holdings (Chen et al., 2015, capital 
structure (Chui et al., 2002), and cost of capital (Gray et al., 2013). To provide insight into 
the culture-based performance determinants of acquisitions and its associated 
methodological effects, Stein Kleppesto (1998) relied on the concept of social identity to 
investigate and study the role of culture in acquisitions. In his study, he posits that each 
firm consists of numerous individuals and these individuals have self-identities that are 
socially and contextually exhibited to help create meaning on both an individual and team 
level. He suggests that socio-cultural ramifications may not necessary yield a unified whole 
but instead create a framework where different identities and viewpoints manifest and 
coalesce thereby having positive impact on acquisition success.   
Stahl and Voigt (2008), and Weber and Yedidia Tarba (2012) examined the impact 
of cultural diversity on acquisition as a way of reconciling  studies that point to both 
positive and negative impacts and their study concluded that cultural diversity affects pre-
merger acquisition performance in a very minimal way. So, considering that there are 
research studies that examined cultural diversity and reported  positive impact on 
acquisition (e.g. Very, Lubatkin et al., 1997; Datta and Puia, 1995), there are other research 
studies that have also established a negative relation in terms of cultural diversity’s impact 
on  acquisition performance (Morosini, Shane et al., 1998). 
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The evidence above suggests that cultural differences are associated with varied 
viewpoints. Combining this with the Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMTs with 
greater cultural diversity should be associated with better acquisition decisions.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis: 
H1. TMT cultural diversity is positively related to acquisition decision quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns. 
3.3. Gender Diversity and Acquisition Quality 
Gender is an important characteristic of TMT diversity from the standpoint of its 
influence on TMT values, perceptions, cognition and overall decision choices (Dezsö and 
Ross 2012; Wang, Sui et al. 2014). Gender is defined as the psychosocial ramifications of 
biological sex, that is female or male (Unger 1979). Deaux and Major (1987) and Eagly 
(1987) defined gender from the view point of the manner in which men and women interact 
with one another and the social role they are supposed to play and enacted in society. In 
the psychology and management literatures, there is ample evidence that supports and 
acknowledges that gender diversity is quintessential when it comes to ethical behavior, 
conservatism, and risk aversion (Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro et al. 2006) in the decision 
making process.  
The literature in economic psychology and finance is equally replete with studies 
that examined, for example, the impact of female managers on firm performance 
(Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Farrell and Hersch, 2005) and concluded that gender 
diversity is positively related with a company’s performance. Their reasoning was that that 
gender diversity results in wider pool of knowledge, which could translate into competitive 
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advantage in comparison to companies that are not diverse. Sila, Gonzalez et al. (2016) 
examined female presence on the executive team and the extent of their contributions in 
terms a firm’s risk profile and position and their study concluded that females in such 
position tend to be more conservative and also, possess high ethical compass. Additionally, 
Al-Mamun, Yasser et al. (2013) argues that gender diversity has a positive effect on  
performance building on the resource based view of the firm, whereas, Ali, Kulik et al. 
(2011) established a negative relationship when it comes to gender diversity and 
performance based on the social identity theory whereas, Svyantek and Bott (2004) study 
on gender and performance produced relatively no effect.  
The evidence above suggests that gender differences are associated with varied 
viewpoints.  Combining this with the Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMTs with 
greater gender diversity should be associated with better acquisition decisions.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis: 
H2. TMT gender diversity is positively related to acquisition decision quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns. 
3.4. Tenure and Acquisition Quality 
Tenure diversity has been shown to have a positive effect on performance and 
improved decisions. This is because studies have shown that extended tenure and tenure 
diversity significantly impact the degree to which top managers leverage their experiences 
and networks to enhance their decision making process (Athanassiou and Nigh 1999). 
Human capital theory suggests that job tenure is positively correlated with enhanced and 
greater job performance because employees acquire more tacit skill set and knowledge 
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about how to make decisions and perform their job more effectively over time (Schmidt, 
Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). Additionally, there are studies that find longer and diverse 
job tenure lead to less creativity and decline in innovative behavior and they define 
creativity as the extent to which a team member of the firm contributes new and useful 
ideas (Shalley, Zhou, Oldham, 2004) and innovative behavior as the generation of novel 
ideas and the effective execution of those ideas within workplace team environment 
(Janssen, 2001). Ng and Feldman (2013) in their study find that long job tenure is positively 
related to increase measures of idea generation during decision making, and improved task 
execution and implementation. In essence, their study suggests that longer job tenure 
enhances the employee’s ability to make decisions that facilitate the implementation of 
change more effectively.   
Finally, in the motivation and job design literature, Hackman and Oldham (1980) 
conducted a study which suggests that longer job tenure leads to decreased intrinsic 
motivation and increased feeling of job dissatisfaction and boredom which culminates into 
poor performance and less creativity. Increase in tenure diversity comes with increase 
procedural knowledge. The study by Hunter and Thatcher (2007) posits that individuals 
with diversity in tenure and more years of service are likely to know more about how to 
handle a myriad of complex problems and roadblocks to task completion.  
The evidence above suggests that tenure diversities are associated with varied 
viewpoints.  Combining this with the Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMTs with 
greater tenure diversity should be associated with better acquisition decisions.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis: 
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H3. TMT current tenure diversity is associated with acquisition decision quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns. 
H4. TMT total tenure diversity is associated with acquisition decision quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns. 
3.5. Age and Acquisition Quality 
Age is an important demographic characteristic that have been studied in recent 
years by several researchers (Randøy, Thomsen et al. 2006; Moscu 2013). The diversity of 
years (i.e. age) is very relevant due to the fact that, depending on the cohort of the particular 
TMT group at a firm, it is possible to attract and sustain interest from certain group of 
investors, enrich TMT decision making process due to experience achieved through years, 
and customers. It is generally thought that without adults, even the young ones have little 
room to learn (Moscu 2013) which extends to the suggestion that age diversity has a 
positive effect on team heterogeneity in terms of performance. However, there are other 
extant research studies that have revealed that age is negatively related to performance and 
this was revealed in the study conducted by Randøy, Thomsen et al. (2006) as well as the 
research performed by Moscu (2013). 
The evidence above suggests that age differences are associated with varied 
viewpoints.  Combining this with the Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMTs with 
greater age diversity should be associated with better acquisition decisions.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis.  
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H5. TMT age diversity is positively related to acquisition decision quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns. 
3.6. Political affiliation and Acquisition Quality 
A good measure of political affiliation is determined by tracing the monetary 
contributions of individuals or PACs to the various political campaign activities either at 
the local, state, or federal level (Hutton, Jiang et al. 2015). Individuals’ political affiliation 
has been found to influence their overall decision making process.  Individuals with 
conservative ideologies are more likely to adopt conservative policies, which in turn may 
result in less risky choices. Therefore, a firm’s capital structure and investment policies 
may be affected (Mayer, Warr & Zhao, 2018).   Additionally, Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 
(2015) find that Republican managers are more likely to adopt conservative corporate 
policies, which is consistent with their conservative personal ideologies.  In essence, their 
findings align with the perceived fact that the Republican party emphasizes a conservative 
philosophy which implies lower levels of leverage, lower capital and research and 
development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments and higher profitability. 
The evidence above suggests that political differences are associated with varied 
viewpoints.  Combining this with the Upper Echelons Theory suggests that TMTs with 
greater political diversity should be associated with better acquisition decisions. Thus, the 
following hypothesis: 
H6. TMT political affiliation diversity is positively related to acquisition decision 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
EMPERICAL DESIGN 
 
4.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
For purposes of this study, TMT is defined to include the top five highest paid executives of 
the company. To investigate the relationships between TMT diversity and acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement return, my study is comprised of firms of the S&P 
1500. My main sample of firms and financial information is obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and ExecuComp databases for the periods 
2010 through 2017. Additionally, I obtain acquisition announcement dates from Securities 
Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database. I established the 
following criteria for pulling the acquisition specific data: 
1. The acquisition is marked completed. 
2. The transaction size must be at least 20% of the acquiring firm’s size. 
3. The acquirer must be publicly traded and domiciled in the U.S. 
4. The acquirer must control 100% of the target. 
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5. The acquirer has annual financial data that is readily available in Compustat 
and stock return data (210 trading days prior to acquisition announcement). 
6. There may be no more than 5 days of missing returns over the estimation  
Finally, I obtain key demographic information such as culture, gender, age, tenure, job and 
job diversity from Boardex database. The above selection criteria were used to generate 
my primary sample. In addition, I also generated two other samples after relaxing the 
acquisition criteria to 5% and 10% (see item two in the selection criteria above). 
4.2. Research Method and Model Specification  
Dependent Variable 
To assess acquisition quality, I use the announcement returns since announcement 
of the transaction reflect the discounted value of the acquisition. For this study, the 
objective is to use event study methodology to compute the abnormal stock returns around 
the announcement using the market model. The market’s reaction to the acquisition is 
measured using the daily stock return data to derive the abnormal stockholder returns and 
this is based on the assumption of market efficiency, in that share prices react in an 
unbiased and timely manner and the extent of the gain is a reflection of the firm in the 
coming periods (Malkiel and Fama, 1970; Roberts, 1967). In line with this, the estimation 
model for determining the daily abnormal return on the stock is: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝐸(?̌?𝑖𝑡)  where                                                 (1) 
t = day measured relative to the event (i.e. acquisition announcement date), 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = abnormal return on stock ί for day t, 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = return on stock ί for day t, 
𝐸(?̌?𝑖𝑡) = expected rate of return on stock ί for day t. 
𝐸(?̌?𝑖𝑡)  which is the measurement benchmark and derived from the market model 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). The market model is estimated over the 210-day period 
preceding the announcement window (-255 to -46 days). The daily returns file retrieved 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) provides the observed returns for 
each stock 𝑅𝑖𝑡 which is calculated as the change in the stock price, plus any dividends paid, 
divided by the closing price of the stock on the day preceding the announcement day. The 
abnormal return for each stock ί, 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, is then computed as the difference between the 
actual return on the stock and the return predicted by the market model.  
The cumulative abnormal returns for each stock ί, CARί,k,l is computed by summing 
the abnormal returns over the event time as indicated below: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑙 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑙
𝑡=𝑘                                                             (2) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑙 is for the period from t = k days until t = l day relative to the event date.  
Finally, I regress TMT diversity on 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑙 to test my hypotheses on the impact of  
TMT diversity characteristics on acquisition quality as implied in announcement period 
returns. My regression estimation procedure for this is as follows:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑙  = ∝  + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑇𝑀𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑞 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑞
𝑚
𝑞=1  +  𝑒𝑖                             
(3) 
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where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑙  represents the cumulative abnormal announcement period returns. 
Additionally, TMTDiversity represents the key explanatory variables of interest which are 
age diversity, political affiliation diversity, gender diversity, total tenure diversity, current 
tenure diversity and cultural diversity of the S&P 1500 list of publicly traded companies. 
Also, ControlVar represents the control variables which include the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization, relative size of the acquisition deal, book leverage and free cash 
flow. 
Independent variables 
The key independent variables are age diversity, political affiliation, gender diversity, total 
tenure diversity, current tenure diversity, total tenure diversity and cultural diversity. These 
diversity measures are for the year preceding the acquisition. To provide a reliable measure 
of within-group heterogeneity or diversity as a variety in these independent variables, I 
measure the categorical differences between the group members (Miner, Haunschild et al. 
2003) using Blau’s index which is also known as Teachman’s index (Teachman 1980). 
Blau’s index is defined as: 
𝐵 =  1 −  ∑ 𝑃𝑖^2𝑘𝑖=1                                                   (4) 
where 𝑃𝑖 represents the proportion of TMT members in the  𝑖th category and k represents 
the number of TMT diversity attributes. In essence, the Blau’s index is computed by adding 
the squared proportions of the TMT members categorically and summing them up, then 
subtracting from 1. The minimum value of Blau’s index is zero and the maximum value 
always depends on the number of categories (ί) of a particular variable of interest and the 
maximum variable can be computed as (ί – 1)/ί where ί represents the number of TMT 
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categories (Korff, Biemann et al. 2009). When TMT diversity increases, the value of Blau’s 
index increases. Theoretically, this effectively means that the maximum value of Blau’s 
index increases with higher qualitatively different categories. The number of theoretical 
maximum for each diversity variable has been derived in the table below: 
Table 3 
Theoretical Maximum Values for Diversity Variables 
Diversity Variable Category (ί) Theoretical 
Maximum 
Age Diversity 3 0.67 
Political Diversity 3 0.67 
Gender Diversity 2 0.50 
Total Tenure Diversity 3 0.67 
Current Tenure Diversity 3 0.67 
Cultural Diversity 2 0.50 
Note: The theoretical maximum possible values of the diversity variables based on Blau’s index. 
 
As noted in Table 3, ί represents the number of categories of the variable (Biemann 
& Kearney, 2009) and the theoretical maximum of Blau’s index for gender is 0.5 whereas, 
the maximum value for cultural diversity is 0.67. These noted differences between the 
variables are only comparable when we remove and correct for these differences and this 
is achieved by standardizing Blau’s index (B). The preferred statistical approach for this 
correction is detail in Agresti and Agresti (1978) Index of Qualitative Variation in which 
they multiplied Blau’s index (B) by the maximum ί/(ί – 1) to get a standardized value that 
ranges from zero to 1.   
Control variables 
For the control variables which have the potential to influence acquisition quality 
performance, I control for  firm characteristics such as firm size which is measured as the 
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natural logarithm of market capitalization, free cash flow and leverage which are shown to 
influence acquisition performance and were drawn from the findings of Parola, Ellis et al. 
(2015), Bange and Mazzeo (2004) and Travlos (1987). I also control for relative deal size.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, I discuss sample descriptive statistics followed by the results of my 
hypothesis tests.   
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
I discuss my sample descriptive statistics for the primary sample first (i.e. 20%). 
This is followed by the discussion of the supplementary samples (i.e. 5% and 10% samples) 
as a means to test and ensure the robustness of the research hypotheses. My primary sample 
using a 20% cut-off for acquisition size has a total of 74 observations, the 10% cut-off 
sample has 96 observations and finally, the 5% cut-off sample has 121 observations. Table 
4A shows the means, standard deviations, the minimum and maximum values of the 
primary sample and tables 4B and 4C show the descriptive statistics for the supplementary 
samples. The definitions of the variables are shown in Appendix A. Table 5 is structured 
similar to Table 4 but contains the correlation coefficients for all the variables in the study.
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For the primary sample which reflects the 20% cut-off sample size, the highest degree of 
diversity as indicated by the respective means are exhibited by Age diversity and Total Tenure 
diversity. The mean values for these two diversity characteristics were 0.629 and 0.624. The next 
highest explanatory variable with comparatively high diversity is Political affiliation diversity with 
a TMT diversity mean value of 0.590 which is then followed by Current Tenure diversity with a 
TMT diversity mean value of 0.314. These are immediately followed by Gender diversity which 
shows a TMT diversity mean value of 0.230.  
The mean cumulative abnormal return is 0.009 or 0.99%. The maximum cumulative 
abnormal return is a positive 0.282 return and the minimum is a negative 0.223 return. This 
spectrum of variation in cumulative abnormal returns is not particularly surprising in light of the 
fact that not all corporate acquisitions result in the increase of shareholder value. Table 4A also 
provides the statistics for the control variables which include the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, the relative size of the acquisition transaction, the book leverage of the acquiring 
firm and the free cash flow the acquirer.  
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Table 4A 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Primary Sample (20%) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
CAR (-2, +2) 74 0.009 0.085 -0.223 0.282 
 
Independent Variables 
Age Diversity 74 0.629 0.214 0.000 1.000 
Political Diversity 74 0.590 0.354 0.000 1.000 
Gender Diversity 74 0.230 0.329 0.000 1.000 
Total Tenure Diversity 74 0.624 0.225 0.000 1.000 
Current Tenure Diversity 74 0.314 0.340 0.000 1.000 
Cultural Diversity 74 0.111 0.242 0.000 1.000 
 
Control Variables 
Market Capitalization 74 7.693 1.264 3.495 10.224 
Relative Size 74 0.736 0.487 0.210 2.670 
Book Leverage 73 0.240 0.224 0.000 1.064 
Free Cash Flow 73 0.115 0.120 -0.026 0.952 
Note: The 20% cut-off sample represents the acquisition deals that are at least 20% of the acquiring firm’s size. 
 
These indicated control variables were measured at the end of the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the acquisition announcement date. The mean natural logarithm of market capitalization 
is 7.693 which is equivalent to $2.1 billion. The corresponding minimum value and maximum 
value were 3.495 and 10.224 respectively which were equivalent to $33 million and $28 billion 
respectively, which is consistent with the study conducted by Levi et al. (2014). The relative size 
variable is commonly used to control for the difficulty in measuring acquisition returns due to the 
relatively larger size of the acquirer in comparison to the target. In this regard, the relative size is 
computed by taking the deal value divided by the market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year 
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prior to the announcement day and as reflected in Table 4A, the mean value is 0.736 with a 
minimum and maximum values of 0.210 and 2.670 respectively. 
In line with the other control variables, leverage is also measured at the end of the 
immediate fiscal year preceding the acquisition announcement date. In table 4A which reflects the 
primary sample, the mean leverage value is 0.240. The minimum and maximum leverage ratios 
are on the spectrum of between 0 and 1 respectively. Free cash flow exhibits a similar pattern of 
behavior and directionally in line with the other aforementioned control variables. The mean value 
for free cash flow is 0.115 and the minimum and maximum values are negative 0.026 and positive 
0.952 with a standard deviation of 0.120.  
The descriptive statistics for the supplementary sample sizes as indicated in Table 4B (i.e. 
(10% cut-off) and 4C (i.e. 5% cut-off) show similar trends and were directionally consistent with 
the overall observations with respect to the primary sample.  
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Table 4B 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Supplementary Sample (10%) 
 Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
CAR (-2, +2) 96 0.006 0.077 -0.223 0.282 
 
Independent Variables 
Age Diversity 96 0.646 0.211 0.000 1.000 
Political Affiliation Diversity 96 0.584 0.350 0.000 1.000 
Gender Diversity 96 0.227 0.328 0.000 1.000 
Total Tenure Diversity 96 0.654 0.227 0.000 1.000 
Current Tenure Diversity 96 0.302 0.334 0.000 1.000 
Cultural Diversity 96 0.110 0.239 0.000 1.000 
 
Control Variables 
Market Capitalization 96 7.886 1.245 3.495 10.372 
Relative Size 96 0.598 0.497 0.097 2.670 
Book Leverage 95 0.251 0.223 0.000 1.064 
Free Cash Flow 95 0.115 0.111 -0.026 0.952 
Note: The 10% cut-off sample represents the acquisition deals that are at least 10% of the acquiring firm’s size. 
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Table 4C 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Supplementary Sample (5%) 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
CAR (-2, +2) 121 0.006 0.070 -0.223 0.282 
 
Independent Variables 
Age Diversity 121 0.639 0.227 0.000 1.000 
Political Affiliation Diversity 119 0.576 0.348 0.000 1.000 
Gender Diversity 121 0.230 0.329 0.000 1.000 
Total Tenure Diversity 121 0.643 0.237 0.000 1.000 
Current Tenure Diversity 121 0.279 0.332 0.000 1.000 
Cultural Diversity 121 0.112 0.241 0.000 1.000 
 
Control Variables 
Market Capitalization 121 7.921 1.208 3.495 10.372 
Relative Size 121 0.488 0.492 0.046 2.670 
Book Leverage 120 0.240 0.223 0.000 1.064 
Free Cash Flow 120 -0.110 0.106 -0.952 0.026 
Note: The 5% cut-off sample represents the acquisition deals that are at least 5% of the acquiring firm’s size. 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrices between the dependent variables, independent 
variables and control variables. In this section, I will first discuss the correlations among the 
different diversity variables, followed by a discussion of the correlations between the abnormal 
returns and the various diversity variables. Finally, I will discuss the correlations between the 
control variables and the various diversity variables. The correlations that are significant at least 
at the minimum 10% level of significance are depicted with an asterisk (i.e. *).  
For the primary sample (Table 5A), the highest correlation with a positive correlation 
coefficient is between current tenure diversity and political affiliation diversity with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.322. Following Cohen’s (1988) recommendation, the 0.322 correlation coefficient 
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is considered moderately strong based on a benchmark which suggests that correlation coefficients 
within the range of between 0.1 to 0.23 equates to weak, 0.24 to 0.36 equates to moderately strong, 
and =>0.37 equates to strong.  Also indicated in Table 5A is the correlation between cultural 
diversity and political affiliation diversity. The associated correlation coefficient is 0.199 and it is 
significant at least at the 10% level of significance. Also worth pointing out is the correlation 
between current tenure diversity and cultural diversity. The correlation coefficient between these 
two variables is 0.199 and it is both positive and significant at least at the 10% level. In addition, 
political affiliation diversity and total tenure diversity show negative but significant correlation 
and the associated correlation coefficient is 0.241. While there were moderate correlations between 
a few of the diversity variables, the correlations between most of the diversity variables were very 
low correlations as shown in the Table 5A. Overall, these diversity variables are capturing different 
dimensions of diversity. So, these diversity variables have very little multi-collinearity with each 
other.  
The cumulative abnormal return is negative but highly correlated with current tenure 
diversity. The correlation coefficient between these two variables is minus 0.235 and significant 
at the minimum 10% level of significance. Also, the cumulative abnormal return is positively 
correlated with age diversity with a correlation coefficient of 0.199 which is significant at the 10% 
level of statistical significance. The other diversity variables do not appear to have any significance 
with cumulative abnormal returns as shown in Table 5A. Based on these observations, it appears 
that diversity variables overall do not have a significant effect on abnormal returns. The foregoing 
suggests that diversity variables may have limited impact on acquisition quality but to draw a more 
robust conclusion, I will have to conduct regression analysis which is presented and discussed in 
the next section.   
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With regards to the control variables, leverage is observed to correlate negatively with 
cultural diversity. The correlation coefficient is 0.216 and it is deemed significant at least at the 
10% level of significance. Leverage also has a high correlation with relative size and the 
correlation coefficient is 0.3800 and it is both positive and significant at least at the 10% level of 
significance. Additionally, leverage is positively and significantly correlated with current tenure 
and the correlation coefficient is 0.205. Also worth noting is the fact that the correlation between 
free cash flow and political affiliation diversity is moderately strong with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.2617 but negative, and the associated correlation is significant at least at the 10% level of 
significance. Additionally, the correlation between the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
and political affiliation is very strong with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.327. The 
correlation coefficient is significant at least at the 10% level of significance. Other pairwise 
correlations with the controls are very low. Overall, there is very little indication that multi-
collinearity between control variables and diversity variables is an issue.       
Table 5B and 5C present the correlations of the two supplementary samples (10% and 
5%). The observations are directionally consistent with the primary sample. 
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Table 5A 
Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
Primary Sample (20%) 
 
Age 
Diversity 
Political 
Diversity 
Gender 
Diversity 
Total 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Current 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Cultural 
Diversity 
CAR 
(-2, +2) 
Market 
Cap 
Relative 
Size 
Book 
Leverage 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 
            
Age Diversity 1.000           
            
Political Diversity 0.1056 1.000          
            
Gender Diversity -0.0453 -0.1298 1.000         
            
Total Tenure Diversity -0.1234 -0.2410* 0.126 1.000        
            
Current Tenure Diversity -0.043 0.3221* 0.0894 0.0847 1.000       
            
Cultural Diversity 0.1169 0.1996* -0.0166 -0.1696 0.1997* 1.000      
            
CAR (-2, +2) 0.1988* 0.0935 -0.1148 -0.0082 -0.2354* 0.1618 1.000     
            
Market Cap -0.1301 -0.3265* 0.2672* 0.1369 -0.0887 -0.1163 0.0101 1.000    
            
Relative Size -0.0353 0.0037 -0.0601 0.0092 -0.0689 -0.1155 -0.0828 -0.1908 1.000   
            
Book Leverage -0.1713 -0.1639 0.1161 0.0272 -0.2052* -0.2157* 0.136 0.2012* 0.3800* 1.000  
            
Free Cash Flow -0.0732 -0.2617* 0.1413 0.0878 0.1063 -0.0481 0.1227 0.1896 -0.0745 0.0555 1.000 
 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Table 5B 
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Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
Supplementary Sample (10%) 
 
Age 
Diversity 
Political 
Diversity 
Gender 
Diversity 
Total 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Current 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Cultural 
Diversity 
CAR 
(-2, +2) 
Market 
Cap 
Relative 
Size 
Book 
Leverage 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 
            
Age Diversity 1.000           
            
Political Diversity 0.0238 1.000          
            
Gender Diversity -0.0732 -0.0885 1.000         
            
Total Tenure Diversity -0.0642 -0.1353 0.1097 1.000        
            
Current Tenure Diversity -0.0294 0.2582* 0.1424 0.0025 1.000       
            
Cultural Diversity 0.1248 0.1673 -0.081 -0.0743 0.1146 1.000      
            
CAR (-2, +2) 0.1434 0.1042 -0.0937 0.009 -0.2230* 0.1740* 1.000     
            
Market Cap -0.0533 -0.3166* 0.2492* 0.2292* -0.1228 -0.1256 -0.0089 1.000    
            
Relative Size -0.1003 0.0181 -0.0387 -0.1221 -0.0213 -0.0805 -0.0317 -0.2921* 1.000   
            
Book Leverage -0.1619 -0.1453 0.0897 -0.0152 -0.1733* -0.2027* 0.1098 0.1998* 0.2384* 1.000  
            
Free Cash Flow -0.1261 -0.1623 0.1173 0.1293 0.0375 -0.0144 0.1509 0.1716* -0.0611 0.0478 1.000 
 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 5C 
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Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
Supplementary Sample (5%) 
 
Age 
Diversity 
Political 
Diversity 
Gender 
Diversity 
Total 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Current 
Tenure 
Diversity 
Cultural 
Diversity 
CAR 
(-2, +2) 
Market 
Cap 
Relative 
Size 
Book 
Leverage 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 
            
Age Diversity 1.000           
            
Political Diversity 0.0427 1.000          
            
Gender Diversity -0.0406 -0.0179 1.000         
            
Total Tenure Diversity -0.0075 -0.0811 0.0451 1.000        
            
Current Tenure Diversity -0.0906 0.2049* 0.0991 -0.0849 1.000       
            
Cultural Diversity -0.0499 0.0972 -0.0187 -0.1147 0.1251 1.000      
            
CAR (-2, +2) 0.0933 0.0659 -0.0831 0.0127 -0.1988* 0.1574* 1.000     
            
Market Cap -0.1084 -0.3378* 0.1774* 0.1711* -0.1391 -0.0809 0.0099 1.000    
            
Relative Size -0.051 0.0363 -0.0382 -0.0524 0.0454 -0.0697 -0.0375 -0.2659* 1.000   
            
Book Leverage -0.1197 -0.1305 0.0364 -0.0791 -0.0125 -0.1659* 0.0764 0.1586* 0.2353* 1.000  
            
Free Cash Flow 0.1520* 0.1720* -0.076 -0.0963 -0.0379 -0.0369 -0.1707* -0.2107* 0.0112 -0.0061 1.000 
 
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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5.2 Event Study Results - Stock Price Abnormal Returns 
In this section, I present and discuss the abnormal returns surrounding the 
acquisition announcement date for the primary sample (20%). The discussion of the 
primary sample is then followed by the two supplementary samples (10% and 5%). Table 
6A presents the primary sample and Tables 6B and 6C present the supplementary samples. 
Each table consists of two panels – Panel A presents the daily event window abnormal 
returns, and Panel B presents the 5-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). My 
discussions are primarily focused on the cumulative abnormal returns in Panel B. The daily 
returns indicated in Panel A are for information purposes only hence, will only be briefly 
discussed.  
Table 6A, Panel A shows the daily abnormal returns for day minus two (-2) to day 
plus two (+2) surrounding the announcement date. It is notable that the daily abnormal 
announcement returns for the five-day event period were all positive suggesting that 
acquisitions are generally viewed favorably by shareholders.  
Table 6A, Panel B, the results show a positive mean cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) value of 0.99% with a corresponding Patell-Z test statistic of 1.635 which is 
significant at least at the 10% level. Overall, this is an indication that the shareholders of 
acquiring firms on average earn an above normal rate of return (Bruner R., 2004). This result 
is consistent with the study conducted by Song and Walkling (2004) where they show that 
shareholders gain from acquisition on the announcement date.   
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Table 6A 
Panel A: Daily Event Window Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index 
Primary Sample (20%) 
 
Day N 
Mean  
Abnormal  
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
-2 74 0.05% 35:39 0.597 -0.26 
-1 74 0.32% 42:32) 1.278 1.368$ 
0 74 0.20% 38:36 1.449$ 0.438 
1 73 0.33% 41:32 0.123 1.258 
2 73 0.08% 30:43( 0.339 -1.318$ 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
 
Panel B: 5-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index 
Primary Sample (20%) 
Day N 
 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-2,+2) 74 0.99% 0.66% 43:31) 1.635$ 1.601$ 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
Table 6B, Panel B for the 10%, the mean CAR is a positive 0.66% with a 
corresponding Patell-Z test statistic of 1.027 which is not significant at the 10% level. This 
mean return is smaller compared to the primary sample. This result is not surprising since 
at the 10% cut-off, I am including smaller acquisition deal sizes which do not impact the 
acquiring company that much.  
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Table 6B 
Panel A: Daily Event Window Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index  
Supplementary Sample (10%) 
 
Day N 
Mean  
Abnormal  
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
-2 96 0.00% 44:52 0.285 -0.579 
-1 96 0.19% 51:45 0.725 0.851 
0 96 0.35% 51:45 2.512** 0.851 
1 95 0.01% 47:48 -1.412$ 0.134 
2 95 0.10% 41:54 0.285 -1.097 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show 
the direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
 
Panel B: 5-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index  
Supplementary Sample (10%) 
Day N 
 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-2,+2) 96 0.66% 0.36% 50:46 1.027 0.646 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
Table 6C, Panel B, the mean CAR is positive 0.43% with a corresponding Patell-Z 
test statistic of 1.058 which is significant at least at the 10% level. This means that the 
shareholders of acquiring firms earn above average positive returns on the announcement 
day regardless of the mode of acquisition (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Kohers and Kohers, 
2000; Mulherin, 2000).  
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Table 6C 
Panel A: Daily Event Window Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index  
Supplementary sample (5%) 
 
Day N 
Mean  
Abnormal  
Return 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
-2 121 0.00% 57:64 0.307 -0.396 
-1 121 0.14% 61:60 0.408 0.331 
0 121 0.27% 64:57 2.244* 0.877 
1 120 0.22% 63:57 0.711 0.787 
2 120 0.02% 49:71< -0.314 -1.770* 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
 
Panel B: 5-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Equally Weighted Index  
Supplementary Sample (5%) 
Day N 
 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return 
Precision 
Weighted 
CAAR 
Positive: 
Negative 
Patell 
Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-2,+2) 121 0.66% 0.43% 65:56 1.455$ 1.058 
 
Note: The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10,  0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, 
respectively, using a generic one-tail test. The symbols (,< or ),> etc. correspond to $,* and show the 
direction and significance of a generic one-tail generalized sign test. 
 
5.3 Regression Results and Discussion 
I utilized pooled ordinary least square regression (i.e. OLS) analysis to test all my 
hypotheses. Table 7 presents a nested format of the results of the OLS regression estimates 
using two-tail test for both the explanatory and control variables, and the CAR (-2, +2) 
denotes the five-day cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer measured using the market 
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model. The table shows my primary sample (i.e. 20% sample) and the two additional 
supplementary modes – that is the 10% and 5% samples which represent the samples of 
the acquisition data based on the value of the acquisition deal as a percentage of the size of 
the acquiring. These two additional supplementary samples were included to test the 
robustness of my primary sample. 
Model Results 
Hypothesis 1 tests the effect of TMT cultural diversity on acquisition quality as 
reflected in the announcement returns and predicts a positive relation between acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns and TMT cultural diversity. As observed 
in table 7 for my primary sample, the effect of TMT cultural diversity on acquisition quality 
as reflected in the announcement return is positive and significant. The regression 
coefficient is 0.0785 with a corresponding t-statistic of positive 1.920. This observed 
coefficient is significant at the 10% level of significance and the result fully supports my 
hypothesis and validates my prediction that TMT cultural diversity is positively related to 
acquisition quality as reflected in the announcement returns and aligns with similar 
theoretical rationale posited by Very, Lubatkin et al., (1997) and Datta and Puia, (1995). 
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Table 7 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares  
Regression Results 
 CAR 20% sample CAR 10% sample CAR 5% sample 
Independent Variables 
Cultural Diversity 0.0785* 0.0588* 0.0564** 
 (1.9200) (1.7700) (2.0900) 
 
Gender Diversity -0.0331 -0.0124 -0.0150 
 (-1.1100) (-0.5100) (-0.7700) 
    
Current Tenure Diversity -0.0846*** -0.0617** -0.0516** 
 (-2.7200) (-2.5200) (-2.6000) 
    
Total Tenure Diversity 0.0506 0.0143 0.0082 
 (1.1500) (0.4100) (0.2900) 
    
Age Diversity 0.0780* 0.0568 0.037 
 (1.7400) (1.5300) (1.3100) 
    
Political Affiliation Diversity 0.0617* 0.0404 0.0281 
 (1.9100) (1.6500) (1.4000) 
    
Control Variables 
Market Capitalization 0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0016 
 (0.0900) (-0.2500) (-0.2600) 
    
Relative Size -0.0272 -0.0052 -0.0064 
 (-1.2100) (-0.3000) (-0.4500) 
    
Book Leverage 0.0931* 0.0560 0.0490 
 (1.8900) (1.4800) (1.6000) 
    
Free Cash Flow 0.164* 0.145** -0.147** 
 (1.9700) (2.0400) (2.3700) 
    
_cons -0.11 -0.062 -0.0391 
  (-1.2500) (-0.8500) (-0.6500) 
 
N 73 95 118 
F-value 2.22 1.94 1.98 
Prob. > F 0.028 0.051 0.043 
R2 0.264 0.188 0.156 
Adj. R2 0.145 0.091 0.077 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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For robustness, the results are similar when I estimate the impact of cultural 
diversity on acquisition quality under both supplementary samples of 10% and the 5%. I 
find similar significance and positive coefficients. For instance, the 10% supplementary 
sample yielded a 0.059 coefficient of regression with a corresponding t-statistic of 1.77 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Also worth pointing out is the 
results of the 5% supplementary sample which also produced similar results – the 
coefficient of regression is 0.056 and a corresponding t-statistic of 2.09 which is 
statistically significant at least at the 10% level of significance.    
Hypothesis 2 predicts that TMT gender diversity is positively related to acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns. According to the results in table 7, the 
primary sample shows a regression coefficient of negative 0.033 with a corresponding t-
statistic of 1.110 which is also directionally negative and statistically non-significant at 
least at the 10% level of significance. These results do not support the hypothesis and 
further suggests that TMT gender diversity has no significant effect on acquisition quality. 
This means that gender heterogeneity at the TMT level does not have a significant impact 
on the decision making process hence, does not significantly influence the generation of 
abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders. These values and results align with the study 
conducted by Ali, Kulik et al. (2011) in which they established a negative relationship 
when it comes to gender diversity and firm performance based on the social identity theory. 
More important is the study conducted by  Svyantek and Bott (2004) where they posited 
that there were no effects of gender diversity on firm performance. The same trend and 
outcome is observed in both supplementary samples (10% and 5% samples). Under the 
10% supplementary sample, the coefficient of regression is negative 0.012 and the related 
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t-statistic is negative 0.510 and it is not significant at least at the 10% level of statistical 
significance. A similar outcome is observed with the 5% supplementary sample as well 
where the regression coefficient is negative 0.015 with a corresponding t-statistic of 0.770. 
Again, these values are not significant at least at the 10% level of significance.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that TMT current tenure diversity is associated with 
acquisition decision quality as reflected in the announcement returns of the acquirer. As 
indicated in table 7, I find a significant relationship between current tenure and acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns however, the relationship is negative. The 
coefficient of regression is negative 0.085 and the corresponding t-statistic is equally a 
negative 2.720. These values are significant at the at least 10% level of significance. This 
result suggests that TMT current tenure diversity has a significant but negative effect on 
acquisition quality. This means that increased levels of TMT current tenure heterogeneity 
at the firm level culminates into negative abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders. 
This is somewhat consistent with the study conducted by Hackman and Oldham (1980) in 
which they suggest that job tenure could potentially lead to decreased intrinsic motivation 
and increased feeling of job dissatisfaction and boredom which could culminate into poor 
performance and less creativity on the job. This significant but negative results as reflected 
by the primary sample is also observed in both supplementary samples (10% and 5% 
samples). Under the 10% sample, the coefficient of regression is negative 0.062 and the 
related t-statistic is negative 2.520. Both of these values are significant at the at least 10% 
level of statistical significance. A similar outcome is observed with the 5% sample which 
produced a regression coefficient of negative 0.052 with a corresponding t-statistic of 2.60. 
Again, these values are very significant at the least 10% level of significance.  
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Hypothesis 4 which is an extension of hypothesis 3 predicts that TMT total tenure 
diversity is associated with acquisition decision quality as reflected in the announcement 
returns of the acquirer. The obtained results as reflected in table 7 for all three samples is 
does not support the hypothesis that TMT total tenure diversity is associated with 
acquisition decision quality as reflected in the announcement returns of the acquirer. For 
the primary sample (20%), the coefficient of regression is 0.051 and the corresponding t-
statistic is 1.150. Even though the regression coefficient is positive, both of these values 
are non-significant at least at the 10% level of significance. Shifting to the supplementary 
samples, I observed a similar trend with the 10% sample which shows a regression 
coefficient of 0.014 with an associated t-statistic of 0.410 which is not significant at least 
at the 10% level of significance. The same observed trend is seen with the 5% sample 
where the coefficient of regression is also 0.008 with a corresponding t-statistic of 0.290 
which is also not significant at least at the 10% level of significance. These results suggest 
that TMT total tenure diversity has no effect on acquisition quality. This means that total 
tenure heterogeneity at the TMT level does not generate significant abnormal returns to the 
acquirer shareholders. 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that TMT age diversity is positively related to acquisition 
decision quality as reflected in the announcement returns. The results obtained for the 
primary sample (20%) is consistent with the prediction that TMT age diversity is positively 
related to acquisition quality as reflected in the announcement returns. This provides 
significant support for the underlying hypothesis. The coefficient of regression is 0.078 
and the corresponding t-statistic is 1.740 and these values are significant at least at the 10% 
level of significance. This outcome is supported by the Moscu (2013) study which 
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predicted a positive relationship between age and firm performance. In line with this, it can 
be argued that TMT age diversity is important in terms of its level of significance and 
impact it has on acquisition quality as reflected in the announcement returns. This 
significant effect is equally positive and this means that TMT age diversity at the firm level 
generates positive and significant abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders. With 
respect to the supplementary samples (10% and 5% samples), I find no significant 
relationship between TMT age diversity and acquisition quality on the basis that the 
regression coefficient in both scenarios are 0.057 and 0.037 with corresponding t-statistic 
of 1.530 and 1.310 both of which are not significant at least at the 10% level of significance. 
In line with this, it can be argued that the magnitude of the deal value is important in 
unravelling the significant effect that TMT age diversity has on acquisition quality.     
Hypothesis 6 tests the effect of TMT political affiliation diversity on acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns and predicts a positive relationship 
between acquisition quality as reflected in the announcement returns and political 
affiliation. The results obtained for the primary sample (20%) is consistent with the 
prediction and does support the hypothesis. The coefficient of regression is 0.062 and the 
corresponding t-statistic is 1.910 and it is significant at least at the 10% level of 
significance. These results suggest that TMT political affiliation diversity has a significant 
effect on acquisition quality and this significance results in the generation of positive 
abnormal returns. This means that political affiliation heterogeneity at the TMT level 
generate positive and significant abnormal returns to the acquirer shareholders. For the 
10% and 5% samples, I find no significant relationship between TMT political affiliation 
diversity and acquisition quality on the basis that the regression coefficient in both 
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scenarios which are 0.04 and 0.03 with corresponding t-statistics of 1.65 and 1.40 
respectively are not significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.  
Control variables in the model are market capitalization, leverage, free cash flow 
and relative size of the acquiring firm. These control variables were measured at the end of 
the fiscal year end prior to the announcement of the acquisition. I find that acquirer size is 
positively correlated with cumulative abnormal return (CAR). This observation implies 
that TMT hubris as posited by Roll (1986) was not a factor in this case, meaning – on 
average, the acquiring firm paid just about the target firm is worth. This observation on the 
other hand contradicts the study conducted by Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) in 
which they found acquirer size to be negatively correlated.   
In line with Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, I control for the acquirer’s 
financial leverage and cash flow. A firm’s financial leverage and in this instance the 
acquirer’s financial leverage is an important governance framework and tool. This 
importance is premised on the fact that higher debt levels could potentially reduce the 
firm’s future free cash flows and invariably limit TMT managerial discretion. 3 
Additionally, the firm’s leverage ratio also provides motivation for the TMT level 
managers to improve the firm’s performance to avoid and prevent the firm from financial 
loss.4 Following these existing literature, I include financial leverage as a control variable 
and it is positively correlated with CAR. This conclusion is evidence in the table 8 which 
                                                          
3 Stulz (1990) develops a leverage model that takes a look at the effect and advantages of leverage being 
the determining factor in discouraging firms from pursuing empire building (i.e. acquisition spree) when 
cash flows are high.  
4 Gilson and Vetsuypens (1994) and Baird and Rasmussen (2001) discuss how creditors are able to 
influence and exert control over firms that are experiencing financial losses. Gilson (1989 and 1990) 
presents proof of higher CEO and board level attrition when firms suffer heavy losses. 
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shows a positive regression coefficient of 0.09 and a t-statistic of 1.89 which is significant 
at the 10% level of significance.   
Concerning cash flow, the free cash flow hypothesis suggests a negative correlation 
with CAR on the basis that TMT managers who run firms with excess free cash flow are 
incentivized and more inclined to pursue empire building through making not so prudent 
acquisitions. The counter argument against this position is that free cash flow could be an 
indication of good firm performance which in this case could positively correlate with 
CAR; meaning that TMT level managers are in a better position to make good acquisition 
choices and decisions. In line with this counter argument, the results support a positive and 
significant relationship between FCF and acquirer announcement returns (CAR). That is, 
the results show regression coefficient of 0.16 and t-statistic of 1.89 which is significant at 
the 10% level of significance.  
Furthermore, I control for relative deal size since studies by Asquith, Bruner, and 
Mullins (1983) find that acquirer announcement returns increase in relative deal size. The 
10% and 5% samples show similar trend and behavior as observed in the 20% sample.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature in management, economic psychology, and finance is replete with 
studies on board diversity and top management team diversity (TMT) and its effect on 
firm performance. However, not much attention has been given to TMT diversity and its 
impact on acquisition quality and in the studies where TMT diversity was researched, it 
was not comprehensive from the standpoint that, in the few of the studies conducted, only 
one TMT diversity characteristics was the main focus of the study. In line with this and 
given the human and financial resources are expended on acquisitions, it is important to 
take a more robust and comprehensive approach by looking at all the contributing factors 
that could potentially impact and influence acquirer performance.
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It is in this regard that my study examined the relationship between acquisition 
quality as reflected in the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns and the TMT diversity. 
Overall, I find that TMT diversity has significant impact on acquisition quality as reflected 
in the announcement returns. I find that acquirer shareholders do in fact earn abnormal 
returns during the period surrounding the announcement of the transaction. These results 
further suggest that the value as reflected in the announcement returns of the acquirer 
depends on the size of the ratio of the deal value as a percentage of the acquiring firm’s 
size.  
I find that TMT diversity characteristics along the dimensions of age, political 
affiliation, current tenure, and cultural diversity have significant effect on acquisition 
quality as reflected in the announcement returns of the acquirer. This means that the 
shareholders of acquiring firms overall can expect to earn higher abnormal returns when 
these aforementioned diversity characteristics are present at the TMT level of the firm. 
Additionally, I find that the impact of these diversity characteristics on acquirer returns as 
reflected in the abnormal returns are more profound when the deal value of the acquisition 
is at least 20% of the acquiring firm’s size. Furthermore, I also find that TMT diversity 
characteristics such as gender diversity and total tenure diversity do not have significant 
effect on acquisition quality as reflected in the announcement returns of the acquirer. Thus, 
not all diversity characteristics appear to enhance acquisition decision quality. In 
conclusion, TMT diversity overall promotes better decision making. 
This study has limitations, which in turn, provide opportunities for future research. 
First, while cultural diversity is a sound empirical construct (Hambrick et al., 1998), it is 
not completely absolute given the fact that a person’s institutional experiences could be 
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influenced by a myriad of other factors. In the case of this study where the country where 
the individual obtained his/her first degree is used as a proxy for nationality, there might 
be instances where their nationality may not correspond to the country where they obtained 
their first degree. There could be cultural differences within a country due to various 
ethnicities, religion, etc. which my simple specification for cultural diversity does not 
pickup. Given this limitation where I am unable to address these types of variations, future 
research could potentially benefit from developing a more precise measure of TMT’s 
cultural diversity.  
Second, I test my hypotheses on detailed dataset of the S&P 1,500 list of companies. 
Gathering detail data on TMT diversity characteristics on the top executives is very tedious 
and demanding. As such, I was able to obtain information on only 74 firms for the primary 
sample. Although this is a limitation for the study, the results of my research present a 
comprehensive first step in disclosing the extent to which TMT diversity characteristics at 
the firm impact and promote better decision making.  Nevertheless, future research may 
seek to broaden the scope to include other indices. Third, the focus of my study was on 
publicly traded companies domiciled in the U.S. Although this approach limits the 
generalization of the research findings, I believe we can extrapolate the findings to cover 
the private sector, as well as international firms that engage in acquisitions strategy as one 
of the means of increasing shareholder value. Therefore, future research should consider 
expanding the scope of any potential study along these lines to include both domestic and 
international firms.   
Finally, future research should also consider TMT diversity characteristics and its 
impact on acquisition quality as reflected in announcement returns from the perspective of 
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the target firm. TMT members of target firms serve as a vital resource to the acquirer firm 
(Bergh, 2001). Their unique role during the pre-acquisition decision phase through when 
the deal is announced has been determined to the critical in terms of increasing value 
creation to the shareholders (Graebner, 2004). Empirically examining and studying the 
diversity characteristics of the target’s TMT and the specific roles they play in the decision 
making process leading up to the announcement of the acquisition could provide very 
useful insights into the overall effect on diversity corporate decision making. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Dependent Variable 
CAR (-2, +2) 5-day event window and 0 representing the announcement 
day. The specified event windows' cumulative abnormal 
return (%) were computed using the market model 
benchmark. The model parameters are estimated over the 
period -255, -46) with the CRSP equally weighted return as 
the market index.  
Independent Variables   
Age Diversity TMT age (variation). 
  
Political Diversity TMT political affiliation - Democrat, Republican or Other. 
  
Gender Diversity TMT gender - variation of female members to male. 
  
Total Tenure Diversity Total work experience - years diversity. 
  
Current Tenure Diversity Work experience with current company - years diversity. 
  
 Cultural Diversity Nationality - place of 1st degree as proxy for nationality. 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Control Variables   
Market Capitalization Natural log of acquirer's market capitalization. The acquirer 
market capitalization is defined as the share price multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding for the preceding year 
to the event date.  
  
Relative Size Deal value over bidder value of equity. Bidder value of equity 
is the market value of equity defined as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end of year 
preceding the announcement year.  
  
Book Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets of the acquirer.  
  
Free Cash Flow Operating income before depreciation less interest expense, 
less income taxes, less capital expenditures as a percentage 
of total assets. 
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